2 banks are publicly listed) where balance sheet information is available using SNL Financial data. We use the most recent data (i.e., as of either December 2012 or June 2013). Table 1 shows that the banks in our stress tests have €22.9 trillion in total assets. Table 1 also provides an overview of all banks at the country level, showing mean regulatory capital ratios and bank characteristics. There is substantial cross-sectional heterogeneity in terms of riskweighted assets among European banks, ranging from 24.5% of total assets (France) to more than 77% (Slovenia), with Deutsche Bank AG (the largest bank in the stress test) reporting that almost 84% of its assets are "riskless" (Table 2 and Appendix I). Further, the average market-tobook ratio of 0.66 suggests that the market is heavily discounting banks' assets portfolios (Table  3) , at least in part due to the relatively high risk of some of the "riskless" assets relative to the markdowns taken by banks on these assets against their book equity values.
Unstressed Capital Shortfall Measures
The four book capital ratios we employ are: (1) Core Tier 1 ratio (C Tier 1), which is core Tier 1 capital divided by risk weighted assets (RWA); (2) book equity divided by total assets (equity/assets); (3) tangible equity/tangible assets, which is book equity less intangible assets divided by total assets less intangibles assets; and (4) the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) Tier 1 LVG ratio, which is C Tier 1 capital divided by tangible assets minus derivative liabilities. 5 Our unstressed measures calculate capital shortfall as the gap of the current book capital measure relative to thresholds: (1) the C Tier 1 ratio relative to an 8% threshold as in the AQR 6 , (2) the equity/asset ratio relative to a 3% threshold, (3) the tangible equity/tangible asset ratio relative to a 3% threshold, and, (4) the IFRS Tier 1 LVG ratio relative to a 3% threshold. These measures are unstressed in that they are capital requirements without accounting for potential losses in future stress scenarios.
Using the four book capital measures and the unstressed thresholds mentioned above, we identify a capital shortfall of between €7.5 billion (using the C Tier 1 ratio and the AQR 8% threshold) and €66.8 billion (using the tangible equity/tangible asset ratio and a 3% threshold) even in the unstressed case (Table 2) .
Stressed Capital Shortfall Measures
To account for potential losses in future stress scenarios, we employ four stressed capital shortfall measures. The first two measures raise the level of capital requirements, while the remaining two measures (also) account for losses: 4 range from €232 billion (using the C Tier 1 ratio and a 8% threshold as in the AQR) and €435 billion (using the tangible equity/tangible assets ratio and a 4% threshold) (Table 7) .
5.
There is a high rank correlation between the shortfalls based on book and market capital ratio measures. However, we find no significant correlation between shortfalls calculated using regulatory (i.e., risk-weighted asset-based) capital ratios and shortfalls calculated under market or book capital ratios. Similar to , this highlights how flawed risk-weighted asset-based measures can be (Table 8 and Figure 3 ). This is a significant operational risk in that even a well-intentioned AQR can under-estimate the true capital shortfall of the banking sector by not addressing the problem of static and out-of-date risk weights, especially for risky sovereign bonds.
6. Cross-country variation in our capital shortfall estimates indicate that: a. French banks are leading each book and market capital shortfall measure, both in absolute euro amounts and relative to its GDP The capital shortfall ranges from €31 billion (using the equity/asset ratio and a 4% threshold) to €285 billion (using the tangible equity/tangible asset ratio and a 7% threshold) ( Table 3 ). The SRISK stress scenario suggests a shortfall of €222 billion, which corresponds to almost 13% of the country's GDP (Table 6 ).
b. German banks are close seconds, although they benefit from a stronger domestic economy with a higher GDP and capacity for public backstops (Table 6 and Figure 4 ).
c. Spanish and Italian banks appear to have large capital shortfalls when nonperforming assets are fully written down. Both countries account for about a third of the total shortfall after write-downs (Table 7) . Market-based measures such as SRISK amount to about 6.5%-7.6% of the GDP of both countries (Table 6 ).
7.
The capital shortfalls are large as a multiple of the banks' market value of equity; in particular, assuming a 4% stressed capital ratio and impairment of the non-performing loan portfolio (Table 9) , they range from multiples of 1.4 (IFRS Tier 1 LVG ratio) to 18.2 (SRISK). The market value of equity reflects the maximum amount of capital a bank can raise today in private markets based on the current market valuation of the firm. If we add subordinated debt as the next group of creditors that is going to be bailed-in, the shortfalls still range as a multiple of the banks' market value of equity and subordinated debt (Table 9 and Figure 5 ) from 0.9 (IFRS Tier 1 LVG ratio) to 1.5 (SRISK). a. Banks in Belgium, Cyprus, and France are leading the group of banks with the largest capital shortfall estimates, with shortfalls as a multiple of the banks' market value of equity and subordinated debt up to 11 (Belgium, SRISK).
b. France and Germany are among the five countries with the largest capital shortfall estimates for their banks. The shortfall estimates range as a multiple of the banks' market value of equity and subordinated debt from 0.3 (Germany, IFRS Tier 1 LVG ratio) to 1.1 (France, SRISK).
c. Capital shortfalls for Italian and Spanish banks range as a multiple of the banks' market value of equity and subordinated debt from 0.1 for Spain (market equity/assets) to 0.91 for Italy (tangible equity/tangible assets).
Implications
As portfolio (micro-level) data of banks' individual exposures is not publicly available, our estimates of capital shortfalls employ publicly available book capital and market data and are motivated by empirical evidence and theory. We believe these estimates provide an interesting benchmark against which the AQR stress tests should be evaluated.
Our results suggest that with common equity issuance (e.g., through deep-discount rights issues) and haircuts on subordinated creditors (e.g., through bail-ins), it should be possible to deal with many banks' capital needs; some will, however, require public backstops, especially if bail-ins are difficult to implement without imposing losses on bondholders, who may themselves be other banks and systemically important financial institutions. The banking sectors in Belgium, Cyprus, and Greece seem likely to require backstops.
Our results also suggest large shortfalls in core European countries such as France and Germany; Germany has many government-owned institutions that may require capital issuances and/or bail-ins. Interestingly, market measures of equity imply significantly greater capital shortfalls for France and Germany than book measures do. Moreover, while Italy's capital shortfalls are much higher relative to the market value of equity than Spain's, the two look similar when allowing for bail-ins on subordinated debt, due to greater subordinated bond holdings of Italian banks.
National governments might be inclined to influence the design of the AQR to prevent these banks from being singled out in the stress tests. This raises the difficult question as to whether the AQR will eventually live up to expectations and restore confidence and creditability in the ECB as a single supervisor. Objective capital shortfall estimates such as ours can provide a valuable defense mechanism against any such political efforts to blunt the effectiveness of the proposed AQR and the intended recapitalization of the euro area banking system.
Note that on December 18, 2013, the EU finance ministers agreed to set up a common resolution fund of €55 billion financed through contributions of banks. This fund becomes fully operational after 10 years and is supposed to pay for the restructuring or resolution of failing banks after bank shareholders and creditors have been bailed in. Our results suggest that these funds might be insufficient in a severe financial crisis and public back-stops (e.g. through the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)) might still be necessary.
Figure 1 Capital Shortfall Using Stressed Book Capital Measures
This figure shows the banks' capital shortfall using stressed book capital measures of 7%. Equity/Assets is book equity over total assets. IFRS Tier 1 LVG is C Tier 1 Capital divided by total assets minus intangible assets minus derivative liabilities. Tangible Equity/Tangible Assets is defined as book equity minus intangible assets divided by total assets minus intangible assets. Shortfalls are reported in million euros and are summed over all banks in each country. Countries with zero shortfall under the respective measure are omitted.
Figure 2 Capital Shortfall Using Stressed Market Capital Measures
This figure shows the banks' capital shortfall using two stressed market based measures: (1) SRISK is the shortfall in case of an aggregate market decline of 40% assuming a prudential capital ratio of 5.5%. (2) The second measure is a market leverage ratio (market equity/assets) and a threshold of 7%. Market equity/assets is market equity divided by asset minus book equity plus market equity. Countries with zero shortfall under the respective measure are omitted.
Figure 3 Correlation of Capital Shortfalls
This figure shows the correlation of banks' capital shortfall assuming that banks need to write-down their net non-performing loans ("loan impairment") and SRISK. C Tier 1 is the Common Tier 1 ratio and defined as Common Tier 1 Capital over Risk-Weighted Assets (RWA). Equity/Assets is book equity over total assets. IFRS Tier 1 LVG is C Tier 1 Capital divided by total assets minus intangible assets minus derivative liabilities. Tangible Equity/Tangible Assets is book equity minus intangible assets divided by total assets minus intangible assets. SRISK is the shortfall in case of an aggregate market decline of 40% assuming a prudential capital ratio of 5.5%. Shortfalls are reported in million euros and are summed over all banks in each country.
Figure 4 Capital Shortfall Using Stressed Market Capital Measures (Scaled by GDP and Market Equity)
This figure shows the banks' capital shortfall using stressed market-based measures. SRISK is the shortfall in case of an aggregate market decline of 40%, assuming a prudential capital ratio of 5.5%. The shortfall is scaled by the country's GDP and the banks' total capitalization. Countries with zero shortfall under the respective measure are omitted.
Figure 5 Shortfalls Relative to Market Equity and Subordinated Debt
This figure shows the banks' capital shortfall relative to market equity plus subordinated debt (including hybrid capital) using stressed bookand market-based measures and incorporating a full write-down of the non-performing loan portfolios. For all measures, we assume a 4% target capital threshold. SRISK is the shortfall in case of an aggregate market decline of 40% assuming a prudential capital ratio of 4%. Market Equity/Assets is market equity divided by asset minus book equity plus market equity. Equity/Assets is book equity divided by total assets. IFRS Tier 1 LVG is C Tier 1 Capital divided by total assets minus intangible assets minus derivative liabilities. Countries with no capital shortfall are omitted. This table reports the banks' capital shortfall using stressed book and market measures. Equity / Assets is book equity over total assets. Market Equity / Assets is a market leverage ratio and defined as market equity over asset minus book equity + market equity. The less stringent benchmark is a leverage ratio of 4% and the more stringent benchmark is a 7% ratio For comparison, we report the shortfall using the unstressed capital ratios (Equity/Assets and Market Equity/Assets) of 3%. Shortfalls are reported in million euros and are summed over all banks in each country. This table reports the rank-correlation between the shortfalls based on book and market capital ratio measures.. Panel A reports the results computing the rank-correlation between the capital shortfall under stressed book capital measures using a 7% threshold and SRISK. Panel B reports the results computing the rank-correlation between the shortfalls after write-down of the non-performing loan portfolios and SRISK. Panel C reports the results computing the rank-correlation between the shortfalls using a stressed book capital measure of 7% ("7% Capital Ratio") and assuming that banks need to write-down their net impaired loans and a 4% target capital threshold of 4% ("Impaired Loans"). **,* indicate significance levels at 1% and 5%, respectively. Table 9 Shortfall and "Bail-Ins"
Book Capital Ratio Stress Test
This table reports the banks' capital shortfall relative to market equity (Panel A) and market equity plus subordinated debt (Panel B) assuming that banks need to write-down their net impaired loans and a 4% capital threshold for each measure. SRISK is the shortfall in case of an aggregate market decline of 40% assuming a prudential capital ratio of 4%. Market Equity / Assets is defined as market equity over asset minus book equity + market equity. Equity / Assets is book equity over total assets. Tangible Equity / Tangible Assets is defined as book equity minus intangible assets over total assets minus intangible assets. IFRS Tier 1 LVG is C Tier 1 Capital over total assets minus intangible assets minus derivative liabilities. 
